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I. Introduction
The second largest charitable organization in the
country in terms of annual money raised is not the
Red Cross, the Salvation Army, or the YMCA — it’s
Fidelity Investments. The sixth largest is Charles
Schwab Corp. Vanguard Group Inc. is No. 10.1
Needless to say, Fidelity, Schwab, and Vanguard are
not running hospitals or soup kitchens. Rather, they
are the three largest sponsoring organizations of
donor-advised funds (DAFs).
DAFs are accounts established by contributions
from charitable donors to a sponsoring organization
that pools and manages many different DAFs.2 The
DAF then makes distributions to operating charities
based on the advice of the donor.3 Because the spon-
soring organizations are, by definition, described
within section 170(c),4 contributions by a donor into
a DAF are tax deductible.5 Importantly, the DAF
need not make any distributions immediately for the
original donor to receive the deduction. Because the
donation is to the sponsoring organization itself, and
the sponsoring organization is a charitable organi-
zation, the original gift is fully deductible.
DAFs have grown immensely in recent years.
According to the National Philanthropic Trust, there
are now more than 238,000 DAFs that together hold
more than $70 billion in assets.6 In 2014 contribu-
tions to DAF were $19.66 billion, and DAFs made
$12.49 billion in distributions to operating chari-
ties.7 The average DAF has about $296,000 in as-
sets,8 so they are sometimes described as mini-
private-foundations and marketed accordingly. For
those without the assets or interest to set up and
operate a private foundation, DAFs achieve a simi-
lar result with less cost and hassle. What’s not to
love?
However, DAFs do not provide the tax benefits
that are sometimes assumed. Although they are
certainly more tax beneficial than private founda-
tions, that’s a pretty low bar.9 In fact, in many
situations DAFs impose a net tax cost on most
1‘‘2015 Philanthropy 400: A Gold Mine of Data on a Quarter
Century of Giving,’’ Chron. Philanthropy, Oct. 29, 2015.
2See section 4966(d)(2)(A). A DAF does not include a fund or
account that makes distributions only to a single, identified
organization or government entity (section 4966(d)(2)(B)(i)), or
one for which the donor or the donor’s designee advises on
which individuals receive grants for travel, study, or other
similar purposes under some circumstances (section
4966(d)(2)(B)(ii)).
3See section 4966(d)(2)(A)(iii).
4See section 4966(d)(1).
5See section 170(a) and (c).
6National Philanthropic Trust, ‘‘2015 Donor-Advised Fund
Report,’’ at 3, Table 1 (2015).
7Id.
8Id.
9For example, private foundations have a lower percentage
limitation on gifts (see section 170(b)(1)(B) and (D)), and the
deduction for gifts of appreciated assets is often limited to the
donor’s basis (see section 170(e)(1)(B)(ii)). Further, private foun-
dations face a series of excise taxes. See, e.g., sections 4940 (2
percent tax on net investment income), 4941 (excise taxes on
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donors relative to a direct donation. Moreover, a
donor would in many cases be worse off donating
today to a DAF than waiting and later donating
directly to the operating charity. Taking an imme-
diate and large deduction does not in itself create a
tax benefit relative to taking a deduction later, and
may even create a tax cost. As I show below, this is
because of the interaction of the deduction with the
ability to avoid capital gains taxation on donations
of appreciated property — because the value of a
future deduction can grow tax free in a donor’s
personal account, donating today to a DAF to get an
immediate deduction will not be beneficial. The
ability to avoid capital gains taxation also means
that the value of tax-free growth in a DAF is limited
to the taxes on annual income, like interest, divi-
dends, and any net capital gain from rebalancing.
Furthermore, in the cases where there is some
positive tax benefit, the additional management
fees imposed by the sponsoring organizations eat
away most or all of it. Fidelity, Schwab, and Van-
guard charge annual fees of 0.6 percent of assets for
the first $500,000 in each DAF, in addition to any
investment fees charged by the underlying mutual
fund or other investment vehicle.10
If my claims are right, the rapid growth of DAFs
is a bit of a puzzle. While some of that growth can
perhaps be explained by donors who truly value
the nontax benefits of a DAF, some is likely the
result of a misunderstanding of the tax benefits, in
part because of marketing by the sponsoring orga-
nizations. That said, DAFs provide real benefits
from the simplification and centralization of giving.
If the fee for those services (0.6 percent of DAF
assets) is offset by any tax benefits from holding
assets in a DAF, in a sense taxpayers are picking up
the tab for the simplification services. Therefore, the
tax benefit of a DAF isn’t missing; it’s just being
soaked up by the DAF sponsoring organizations as
a fee for their services.
II. Background on DAFs
Although DAFs have grown rapidly in recent
years, their basic structure goes back to at least the
1930s. The first were established by community
foundations (also known as community trusts),
which pool donations from many donors to central-
ize investment and grant-making. The first commu-
nity foundation was likely the Cleveland
Foundation, established in 1914.11 For the first few
decades, community foundations existed just as one
pool of money controlled by the foundation itself.
But in 1931 the New York Community Trust estab-
lished the first DAF,12 a separate pool that was
controlled by the foundation but gave the donor
some voice on distributions in the form of advice.
Another DAF was created in 1935,13 and more
followed.
In 1969 Congress amended the tax code to im-
pose tighter rules on gifts to private foundations,14
but it provided a carveout for foundations that
operate like community foundations — those that
pool donations into a common fund and meet
specified payout requirements.15 Those foundations
are treated as publicly supported 50 percent chari-
ties — those for which donors can take a donation
deduction of up to 50 percent of adjusted gross
income.16 If the separate funds or trusts had instead
been viewed as separate entities, they would have
failed the public support test.
But it was not immediately clear whether DAFs
would be given the same benefit. In 1983 the IRS
denied tax-exempt status to a foundation that re-
sembled a DAF sponsoring organization, claiming
that it was merely a conduit for private foundation-
like entities that were using the sponsoring organi-
zation as a way to avoid being labeled as private
foundations.17 Further, the IRS claimed that the
foundation was essentially just a money-making
venture, because it took fees from the donors to
manage the accounts and also from grant appli-
cants.18 The foundation brought suit for a declara-
tory judgment on its tax-exempt status, and the
Claims Court held in 1987 that the foundation did
in fact qualify for tax-exempt status under section
501(c)(3).19
self-dealing), 4942 (excise tax on undistributed income), and
4943 (excise tax on excess business holdings).
10See Fidelity Charitable, ‘‘What It Costs,’’ available at http://
www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-account/what-it-costs.shtml;
Schwab Charitable, ‘‘Fees and Account Minimums,’’ available at
http://www.schwabcharitable.org/public/charitable/donor_a
dvised_funds/fees_and_account_minimums; and Vanguard
Charitable, ‘‘Fees and Expenses,’’ available at https://www.van
guardcharitable.org/individuals/fees_and_expenses.
11See Cleveland Foundation, ‘‘Our History,’’ available at
https://www.clevelandfoundation.org/about/history.
12See Victoria B. Bjorklund, ‘‘Charitable Giving to a Private
Foundation: The Alternatives, the Supporting Organizations,
and the Donor-Advised Fund,’’ 26 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 107, 114
(2000); and New York Community Trust brochure, ‘‘Donor-
Advised Funds in the New York Community Trust.’’
13See Winston-Salem Foundation, ‘‘Milestones,’’ available at
http://www.wsfoundation.org/netcommunity/page.aspx?pid
=825.
14See Tax Reform Act of 1969, P.L. 91-172, section 101.
15See section 170(b)(1)(F)(iii), added by TRA 1969, section
201(a).
16See section 170(b)(1)(A)(vii) (granting 50 percent charity
status to private foundations described in section 170(b)(1)(F)).
17Nat’l Found. Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 486, 490 (1987).
18Id.
19Id. at 494.
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Perhaps emboldened by that holding, Fidelity
established the first commercial gift fund in 1991,
and the IRS granted its application for tax-exempt
status.20 Vanguard followed in 199721 and Schwab
in 1999,22 as did other commercial sponsoring orga-
nizations.23 Here, I distinguish the commercial gift
funds from the community foundations and trusts
that were already operating DAF-type funds. Com-
munity foundations are established independently
for purposes of charitable grant-making. Commer-
cial gift funds, on the other hand, are established by
for-profit investment managers. To be clear, how-
ever, many of the issues discussed below are the
same whether the DAF sponsoring organization is a
community foundation or a commercial gift fund.24
The commercial gift funds have grown rapidly.
In 2003 the three main commercial gift funds had
total contributions of about $1.1 billion, but by 2013,
total contributions had risen to about $6.7 billion.
Total assets have similarly grown from $3.7 billion
to $24.2 billion. Almost all the growth in assets is
from contributions; investment returns have been
relatively smaller, averaging 0.96 percent (Schwab),
1.67 percent (Vanguard), and 2.44 percent (Fidelity)
over that same period. (See figures 1-4 for more
data.25)
Seeing this rapid growth, the IRS,26 commenta-
tors, and ultimately Congress demanded more scru-
tiny. In 2000 Treasury proposed tightening up the
test for whether a sponsoring organization qualifies
as a public charity by requiring a payout rate and
that all distributions go to public charities or gov-
ernmental entities.27 In the Pension Protection Act
of 2006 (PPA, P.L. 109-280), Congress added the first
statutory definitions of the terms ‘‘donor-advised
fund’’ and ‘‘sponsoring organization’’ in enacting
excise taxes on non-charitable distributions, excess
benefit transactions, and similar misuses of chari-
table funds.28 The PPA also amended the code to
state that contributions to a DAF would not be
deductible unless the sponsoring organization
meets specified criteria29 and supplies the donor
with written acknowledgment that the sponsoring
organization has exclusive legal control over the
assets contributed.30 The PPA also instructed Trea-
sury to undertake a study on DAFs, in particular on
whether the immediate deduction was appropriate
given that donors still had some implicit control
over the funds, and whether DAFs should have a
required payout rate.31
In 2011 Treasury issued the required report. The
report stated that allowing an immediate deduction
is appropriate because the donors part with control
of the assets and that the lag between donation and
charitable use is no different than in other charitable
contexts, such as charitable endowments, and that
the same deduction rules used for other organiza-
tions should apply. The report also found that
payout rates for DAFs are higher than for private
foundations, and so it would be ‘‘premature to
recommend a distribution requirement for DAFs at
this point.’’ Regarding donor advice, the report
stated that even if the sponsoring organization feels
‘‘an obligation to use donated funds in a manner
preferred by the donor,’’ that does not disqualify the
gift from being completed, and that the sense of
obligation is not unique to DAFs.32 Treasury im-
plied, however, that additional data and research
could suggest different regulatory responses, espe-
cially as the effects of the new rules became clearer
over time.33
Both before and after the report, commentators
have been concerned that a deduction is granted
immediately even though the funds won’t be used
until some point in the future (or possibly never).34
20See John F. Coverdale, ‘‘Legislating in the Dark: How
Congress Regulates Tax-Exempt Organizations in Ignorance,’’
44 U. Rich. L. Rev. 809, 814 (2010); Ray D. Madoff, ‘‘It’s Time to
Reform Donor-Advised Funds,’’ Tax Notes, Dec. 5, 2011, p. 1265,
at 1266; and Monica Langley, ‘‘Fidelity Gift Fund Soars, but the
IRS Is Skeptical,’’ The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 12, 1998.
21See Vanguard Charitable, ‘‘History of Vanguard Chari-
table,’’ available at https://www.vanguardcharitable.org/who
_we_are/history.
22Schwab Charitable, ‘‘About Schwab Charitable,’’ available
at http://www.schwabcharitable.org/public/charitable/about
_schwab_charitable.
23See Michael J. Hussey, ‘‘Avoiding Misuse of Donor Advised
Funds,’’ 58 Clev. St. L. Rev. 59, 63 (2010); and Madoff, supra note
20, at 1266.
24Indeed, some of the issues may be worse for a community
foundation since the investment fees are less transparent.
25All data in the charts come from the sponsoring organiza-
tions’ Forms 990, available at http://www.guidestar.org.
26See Langley, supra note 20 (discussing IRS audits).
27Treasury, ‘‘General Explanation of the Administration’s
Fiscal Year 2001 Revenue Proposals’’ (2000), at 107.
28PPA section 1231-1235 (codified at sections 4943, 4958, 4966,
and 4967).
29The sponsoring organization cannot be a veterans organi-
zation, fraternal society, or cemetery corporation, nor can it be a
Type III supporting organization unless it is a functionally
integrated Type III supporting organization. Section
170(f)(18)(A). See PPA section 1234.
30Section 170(f)(18)(B).
31PPA section 1266. The IRS issued Notice 2007-21, 2007-1
C.B. 611, requesting public comment on these issues.
32Treasury, ‘‘Report to Congress on Supporting Organiza-
tions and Donor Advised Funds’’ (Dec. 2011), at 6-7.
33Id. at 83.
34See, e.g., Hussey, supra note 23, at 74; Madoff, supra note 20,
at 1265; New York State Bar Association Tax Section, ‘‘Report
Responding to Notice 2007-21 Concerning Donor-Advised
Funds and Support Organizations’’ (June 6, 2007), at 13-14; Alan
Cantor, ‘‘Donor-Advised Funds Let Wall Street Steer Charitable
Donations,’’ Chron. Philanthropy, Oct. 28, 2014; and Madoff, ‘‘5
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The implication is that DAFs hurt charities by
accumulating assets instead of distributing them,
while taxpayers and sponsoring organizations ben-
efit. I share the concern about the harm to charities,
but as I show below, donors themselves are also
hurt through tax costs and high fees. If, despite this,
donors are still attracted to DAFs it must be because
either the nontax benefits are worth the cost or there
is a misunderstanding of the tax benefits.
III. The Claimed Tax Benefits of DAFs
In this section I review some of the particular tax
benefits claimed for DAF donations. I focus on
issues particular to DAFs, especially where there is
a timing difference between the contribution to the
DAF and the ultimate distribution to an operating
charity. There are many other tax advantages to
donating property to charity — DAF or operating
charity — but I set those aside.35 Similarly, I hold
constant the year of ultimate distribution to an
operating charity — I thus compare making a
current contribution to a DAF today to fund a
future distribution with simply waiting and giving
directly at the future date. If the DAF actually
changes the timing of the ultimate distribution —
for example, because a donor would have donated
sooner to an operating charity otherwise — that
would be a concern for philanthropy.36 However, as
I show below, it’s unlikely that a donor gets a tax
benefit from delaying the ultimate distribution out
of a DAF.
A. Accelerated Deduction
The essential tax policy concern is that donors are
getting an immediate and large deduction for
amounts that will go to an operating charity only
later, or perhaps never. But in fact there is no tax
benefit from accelerating the deduction because the
law permits the donor to donate appreciated prop-
erty directly to a charity without realizing any
potential capital gain.37 Thus, if a donor simply
saves the money himself — perhaps in an LLC
named for himself and his spouse38 — and donates
appreciated property later, he will get a larger
deduction, the value of which will have grown
tax-free. (I ignore for now any annually taxed
income, such as interest or dividends.) Moreover, in
many cases there may be an additional tax cost to
the immediate contribution to the DAF because the
tax savings from the contribution may be rein-
vested, and the reinvested funds my generate in-
come subject to tax.
Suppose I have appreciated property worth $100
that I would like to use to fund a donation to a
charity next year. I expect that property to appreci-
ate 10 percent between now and then. (Or equiva-
lently, I have $100 in cash that will be invested in the
same portfolio, whether in a DAF or in my own
taxable account.) If I contribute the money now to a
DAF, I get a $100 deduction, which, if I’m in the 40
percent bracket, is worth $40 to me. Next year,
when the asset will be worth $110, the DAF will
distribute the proceeds to the charity. Meanwhile,
the $40 value of the deduction, if invested in a
similar portfolio, will have grown to $44.
If instead I simply hold the asset, it will be worth
$110 to me next year. When I donate it directly to
the charity,39 I will get a $110 deduction, which will
be worth $44 to me. And of course, I avoid taxes on
any appreciation in the asset. Thus, in both cases,
next year the charity gets $110, and I get $44.
Indeed, I may actually be worse off in the DAF
case because the $4 growth is taxable, leaving me
with only $43.20 if I were to convert it to cash that
year (assuming a 20 percent tax on capital gains).
But in the direct donation case, I get the full $44 (see
Table 1). If I hold the asset myself, the value of the
deduction grows at a pretax rate of return, whereas
if I give the asset to a DAF, the value of the
deduction grows at an after-tax rate of return.
Essentially, direct ownership of appreciating assets
intended to be given to charity later is a better DAF
than the DAF itself.40
Myths About Payout Rules for Donor-Advised Funds,’’ Chron.
Philanthropy, Jan. 13, 2014. Another set of concerns relates to the
ability of donors to exercise a degree of control that could lead
to private benefit even though they have no legal control. See,
e.g., NYSBA, supra at 21-29. This is less of a concern following
the PPA. Further, private benefits of this sort are unlikely to
occur for DAFs controlled by the major commercial gift funds.
Thus, I assume here that the issues are largely ones of timing
and fees, not private benefit.
35For example, I don’t discuss estate tax issues, because a
DAF is just one possible way to get assets out of an estate.
36See Brian Galle, ‘‘Pay It Forward? Law and the Problem of
Restricted-Spending Philanthropy,’’ 92 Wash L. Rev. ___ (coming
2016).
37The issues discussed here could also apply to donations of
publicly traded stock to a private foundation. See section
170(b)(1) and (e)(5).
38See John Cassidy, ‘‘Mark Zuckerberg and the Rise of
Philanthrocapitalism,’’ newyorker.com (Dec. 2, 2015) (discuss-
ing the Chan Zuckerberg Initiative).
39This of course assumes that the charity can accept noncash
donations, including non-publicly traded stock. But even if the
charity won’t accept them, the donor could simply use a DAF as
a conduit, which is totally reasonable. The donor could give the
assets to a DAF in the later year and then immediately advise
the sponsoring organizations to sell the asset and distribute the
proceeds. See infra Section III.F. But that is a separate question
from whether a donor should have the DAF hold and accumu-
late assets for a period.
40Algebraically, the tax benefit of giving to a DAF this year is
worth:
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We get a similar result if the donor grosses up the
donation by the amount of the deduction.41
Even if the taxpayer doesn’t get an extra benefit
from the immediate deduction, is the fisc somehow
hurt by allowing it? Unlikely. If the government
grants a deduction for the gift to the DAF this year,
it lowers its own tax revenue for the year by $40.
The argument for incurring this tax expenditure
(leaving aside distributional issues) is that it
amounts to a subsidy for charitable giving to en-
courage private spending on public goods. But if no
charity is actually occurring in the year of the gift, is
that a tax expenditure well spent?
Suppose the government has to borrow money
for one year to make up the $40 shortfall. It borrows
at some rate well below the 10 percent return that
the asset earns — let’s say 2 percent. Next year it
will repay the lender $40.80. But next year there will
be an additional $44 in tax revenue because $110 of
taxable income goes unsheltered (because the donor
gave $100 this year instead of $110 next year). So the
government makes a profit — it essentially borrows
at 2 percent to lend at 10 percent by accelerating the
deduction one year, in addition to the extra 80 cents
it earns from the growth in the $40 deduction.42
Under these assumptions, therefore, the govern-
ment actually increases revenue, in present-value
terms, from encouraging earlier donations to
DAFs.43 This may be one reason the Treasury report
(1) (1 + ) - [ (1 + ) - ]t C r t t C r t Cm m
n
c m
n
in year n, where C is the amount of the contribution, tm is the
marginal tax rate, tc is the capital gains tax rate, and r is the
market rate of return. This reduces to:
(2) {(1 + ) - [(1 + ) - 1]}t C r t rm
n
c
n
In contrast, giving directly to charity in year n is worth:
(3) 1 + )t C( rm
n
Thus, as long as tc and r are both positive, giving later is better.
The capital gains rate may be zero, however, if the donor plans
to give away the future proceeds of the current deduction as
another charitable contribution in a future year, or if the donor
dies and the basis of the assets purchased with the deduction is
stepped up to fair market value at death.
41With grossing up, we would just divide equations (1) and
(3) by (1 - tm), so the same comparison between (2) and (3) holds.
The intuition for why (3) is still better than (2), even though the
donor essentially invests the value of the deduction in the DAF,
is that the donor in the DAF case ought to gross up only by the
present value of the deduction, which as shown in (2), is not 100
percent of the nominal deduction because there will be some tax
cost as it grows (see also infra Equation (6)). If the donor grossed
up by the full value of the deduction in year 1, she would still
have some tax cost in year 2 from the growth in that larger
deduction and so would have essentially grossed up by too
much.
42In other words, the present value of the lost revenue as a
result of a future deduction to a charity is greater than the
present value of a deduction to a DAF today. The government
revenue loss from a contribution C today is simply tmC. But the
present value of the future deduction of C is:
(4) mm
n
g
n
t C( r1 + )
( r1 + )
where rm is the market rate of return and rg is the government’s
borrowing costs. As long as rm > rg, this amount will be bigger
in present-value terms than the current deduction.
Key to this result is using the government’s borrowing rate
as the discount rate, rather than a market rate of return. While
government budgeting uses the government’s borrowing rate,
some argue that fair-value accounting, i.e., using a market
discount rate, would be a better approach. See, e.g., Congressio-
nal Budget Office, ‘‘Fair-Value Estimates of the Cost of Selected
Federal Credit Programs for 2015 to 2024’’ (May 2014), at 1-4;
and Jason Delisle and Jason Richwine, ‘‘The Case for Fair-Value
Accounting,’’ Nat’l Affairs 95 (Fall 2014). My view is that
fair-value accounting would not be an improvement over the
current accounting rules. See, e.g., David Kamin, ‘‘Risky Returns:
Accounting for Risk in the Federal Budget,’’ 88 Ind. L.J. 723
(2013) (arguing against the fair-value method and risk adjust-
ment generally in federal budgeting).
43Note that the return on the tax revenue itself is irrelevant.
Having $40 in revenue could allow the government to invest in
productive projects that could produce a return (e.g., research
and development that increases tax revenue). But in my ex-
ample, the government has that $40 in year 1 in either case — in
Table 1. Accelerated Deduction Example
Give to DAF
This Year
Give to Charity
Next Year
Y1 starting cash
balance
$100 $100
Y1 gift $100 $0
Value of Y1 tax
deduction
$40 $0
Y2 funds for
charity
$110 $110
Y2 gift to
operating charity
$110 (from DAF) $110 (direct)
Value of Y2 tax
deduction
$0 $44
Y2 cash balance $44 $44
Y2 after-tax cash
balance
$43.20 $44
Table 2. Government Revenue
Give to DAF
This Year
Give to
Charity
Next Year
Y1 tax revenue $0 $40
Y1 borrowing $40 $0
Y1 interest expense $.80 $0
Y2 tax revenue $44 $0
Y2 bond repayment $40.80 $0
Y2 net cash $43.20 $40
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comes down relatively lightly on DAFs.44 Of course,
the government should not care simply about rev-
enue maximization, but about whether the use of
DAFs causes less revenue loss than later direct gifts
— that may be one reason for the government not to
crack down too hard. On the other side of the
ledger, however, is the bigger question whether
DAFs actually lead to smaller future gifts in practice
because of poor investment management, high fees,
and private benefits.
B. Tax-Free Growth
In the example above, I assumed that all the
return from the assets used to fund the donation is
in the form of capital gain. Because capital gain can
be avoided simply by donating the appreciated
asset, there is nothing to be gained from using a
DAF only to avoid taxes on that growth. However,
the return from an asset can also take the form of
annually taxed items of income, such as interest,
dividends, and for mutual funds, capital gains
distributions.45 Also, if the asset in question is a
diversified portfolio, there may be capital gain
realizations when rebalancing between asset
classes.46 If the assets produce a lot of that annually
taxed income, there is a tax benefit from holding
them in a DAF. As a tax-exempt organization, the
DAF sponsoring organization would not have to
pay any tax on those items of capital gain income,
and therefore, more could be reinvested, generating
more funds for later disbursement to an operating
charity. Brian Galle has thus described the value of
donating to a private foundation as essentially
avoiding the lock-in effect from holding a portfolio
in a taxable account.47
This real tax benefit may in some circumstances
be very valuable. Bonds, real estate, and stock of
closely held businesses, for example, may produce
much of their return in the form of annually taxed
cash flows rather than appreciation. Similarly, a
company founder or executive may be overly con-
centrated in that company’s stock and wish to
diversify, thus triggering capital gain. But the more
likely case is donors simply donating stock or
mutual fund shares out of their portfolios, or even
just cash.48 For example, Treasury found that in
2005 nearly 96 percent of all noncash contributions
were either corporate stock or mutual funds.49
If that’s the case, the benefits from tax-free
growth are more limited. First, a well-managed
portfolio can often avoid much of these tax costs
through, for example, holding more growth stock,
aggressive loss harvesting, or the strategic use of
other tax-preferred plans like section 401(k) plans,
IRAs, and section 529 plans.
Second, any tax benefit needs to be weighed
against other costs of holding assets in a DAF. By
some estimates, the tax drag on a typical equity
mutual fund is somewhere between 0.27 percent
and 1.2 percent.50 The low end is for the relatively
few tax-managed mutual funds, and the high end is
for actively managed funds. Equity index funds are
in the middle, with a tax drag of around 0.77
percent.51 But that is awfully close to the 0.6 percent
fee that most of the commercial gift funds charge, in
addition to the fees for the underlying funds.
Holding an actively managed mutual fund in a
DAF may provide better after-tax, after-fee growth
than holding that fund outside a DAF, but that is a
function of poor tax management by active fund
managers. If a well-managed portfolio faces a tax
burden more like 0.27 percent — the estimate for
tax-managed funds — the donor would be worse
off in holding that portfolio or fund in a DAF. In
that case, the DAF sponsoring organization cap-
tures all the tax benefit from the tax-free growth —
and then some. In essence, all taxpayers pay the fee
for the simplification and centralization benefits
that the DAF provides, with little burden on the
donor herself. The tax benefit from having a tax-
exempt organization manage the portfolio accrues
to the investment managers, not to the donors or
charities.
one case, it’s from tax revenue, and in the other, it’s from
borrowing. Thus, the only factor is the cost of borrowing, not the
return on the cash.
44See supra text accompanying notes 31-32.
45This could also include rents, royalties, and other forms of
periodic income from property.
46Or alternatively, there is a lock-in cost to holding assets in
a taxable portfolio if the taxpayers avoid rebalancing so as not to
trigger gain.
47Galle, supra note 36.
48According to Fidelity’s website, 62 percent of the donations
in 2013 were in the form of appreciated securities (available at
http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-strategies/tax-estate-
planning/appreciated-securities.shtml). It’s unclear what the
breakdown is in the remaining 38 percent among cash, real
estate, partnership interests, and other forms of property.
49See Treasury, supra note 32, at 61.
50See, e.g., Clemens Sialm and Hanjiang Zhang, ‘‘Tax-
Efficient Asset Management: Evidence From Equity Mutual
Funds,’’ National Bureau of Economic Research working paper
21060 (Apr. 2015), at 34 (also finding that tax-efficient manage-
ment does not reduce pretax performance); see also James Daniel
Bergstresser and James Poterba, ‘‘Do After-Tax Returns Affect
Mutual Fund Inflows?’’ 63 J. Fin. Econ. 381, 389-390 (2002)
(finding tax burdens of between 0.9 percent and 4.7 percent but
that during the 1993-1999 period when equity returns were very
high, the mean pretax return on equity mutual funds was 19.1
percent).
51See Sialm and Zhang, supra note 50.
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C. Lumpy Income and Bracket Shifting
The above sections describe the tax treatment of
contributions to a DAF in the typical case, but some
of the tax planning of DAFs involves atypical
periods of lumpy income. In some of these cases,
DAFs may provide an additional tax benefit. A
spike in income can have two effects. First, it can
push income that would otherwise have been in a
lower bracket into a higher bracket. A donation in
that year would thus be more valuable. Second,
higher income in one year can allow for a higher
donation cap under the percentage limitations of
section 170(b).
1. Bracket shifting. Lumping a donation into a
high-bracket year provides a real tax benefit if the
assets are not held in the DAF for too long after the
contribution. If they are held too long, the tax on the
growth in value of the immediate deduction erodes
any benefit from the bracket shift. Consider the
same $100 gift as above. This year the marginal tax
rate that would apply is 40 percent, but next year it
is 35 percent. The results are shown in Table 3A.
The savings thus amount to $4.70, or $4.27 in
present value, rather than the $5 that might be
expected based on the 5 percent spread in tax rates.
And those savings will shrink as the time between
the current year and the ultimate disbursement
elapses. Consider Table 3B, in which the ultimate
distribution is two years, rather than one, after the
DAF contribution.
Here the savings are $4.37, or just $3.61 in present
value. The present value of the pretax savings at the
end is always $5, but because the additional tax on
the earnings from investing the original $40 deduc-
tion also grows — whereas the growth is completed
untaxed when giving directly later — the after-tax
value of giving early declines the longer the gap
between the DAF gift and the ultimate distribution
to an operating charity. Indeed, under these as-
sumptions, the value of giving later exceeds the
present value of giving today if the funds are
actually distributed to an operating charity 11 years
or more after the current period, even if the donor is
in the lower bracket in the future.52
This analyis assumes that donors can actually get
themselves down a bracket. It’s ultimately an em-
pirical question how often that occurs, and there
appear to be no publicly available data on the
characteristics of DAF donors. My assumption,
however, is that most of the individuals and couples
52Algebraically, suppose that tM is the higher marginal tax
rate that will apply this year, and tm is the lower marginal rate
that will apply in some future year n. As before, r is the market
growth rate. Taking Equation (2) and discounting it to the
present period with discount rate r, the present value of the
DAF gift today is:
(5)
n
M
n
n
cCt r t r{(1 + ) - [(1 + ) - 1]}
( r1 + )
or:
(6)
M ct C 1 - t 1 - n( r1 + )
1( (( (
By contrast, the present value of giving directly to a charity
in year n with the lower marginal rate is:
(7) m
t C
n
n
( r1 + )
(1 + )r
or simply tmC. If we set tM = tm + γ, this becomes tMC - γC.
Comparing this to Equation (6), a donor should give to a DAF
in the current year when:
(8) ct CM 1 - n( r1 + )
1( (
As n and r get bigger, the right side of the inequality gets
bigger, so if n and r are high enough, the inequality will no
longer hold. Solving for this with γ = 0.05, tM = 0.4, tc = 0.2, and
r = 0.1 gives us n < 10.29. For n larger than that, the donor is
better off waiting and donating at time n, even though the donor
may be in the 35 percent bracket at that time. Different assump-
tions will of course yield different results.
Table 3A. Shifting Brackets — One Year
Give to DAF
This Year
Give to Charity
Next Year
Y1 starting cash
balance
$100 $100
Y1 gift $100 $0
Value of Y1 tax
deduction
$40 $0
Y2 funds for
charity
$110 $110
Y2 gift to
operating charity
$110 (from DAF) $110 (direct)
Value of Y2 tax
deduction
$0 $38.50
Y2 cash balance $44 $38.50
Y2 after-tax cash
balance
$43.20 $38.50
Table 3B. Shifting Brackets — Two Years
Give to DAF
This Year
Give to Charity
In 2 Years
Y1 starting cash
balance
$100 $100
Y1 gift $100 $0
Value of Y1 tax
deduction
$40 $0
Y3 funds for
charity
$121 $121
Y3 gift to
operating charity
$121 (from DAF) $121 (direct)
Value of Y3 tax
deduction
$0 $42.35
Y3 cash balance $48.40 $42.35
Y3 after-tax cash
balance
$46.72 $42.35
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donating the large amounts that would matter are
unlikely to get down a bracket. Of the $182 million
in reported deductions for all charitable contribu-
tions in 2013 (not just to DAFs), about one-third
were from households with AGIs of $500,000 or
higher and of the $48 million in reported noncash
contributions, more than half were from households
with AGIs of $500,000 or more.53 It’s likely that DAF
donors skew even more toward those in the highest
bracket.
2. Section 170(b) percentage limitations. The other
atypical situation in which a DAF may be beneficial
is when the donor is otherwise confronting the
section 170(b) percentage limitations. This might be
because the donor normally has relatively low
income but faces a one-time spike and thus has the
ability to deduct much more in that year.54 If a
donor who normally has AGI of $100,000 a year
(and thus can take a deduction for only up to
$50,000 annually) has one-time income of $1 mil-
lion, she could give $500,000 in cash that year and
get a full deduction.55 However, because, as shown
in Section III.A, the timing of the deduction doesn’t
matter, this would be relevant only when the donor
would otherwise face some lifetime giving cap, not
merely an annual cap. If the donor wanted to max
out her donations every year, giving more in a
lumpy year would increase the total lifetime deduc-
tion. But if it only accelerated giving that would
otherwise occur in later years, there’s no real ben-
efit. Furthermore, there’s nothing special about
DAFs in this regard, except as a place to park
money in the lumpy years if the donor wanted to
smooth contributions over the years — the donor
could simply give the larger amounts directly to
charity.
More specific to DAFs is that the sponsoring
organizations are public charities, and thus donors
can give up to 50 percent of their AGI for cash but
only 30 percent for capital gain property. In Section
III.A, I said that the donor could achieve even better
results than a DAF by just investing the property
himself. That was assuming the desired asset was
capital gain property and that the donor was not
facing the 30 percent limitation. But if the donor
would like to donate cash exceeding 30 percent of
his AGI, he would need to do it immediately. If
instead he invested it in a personal portfolio, his
donation in future years would be capped at 30
percent rather than 50 percent of AGI, unless he
realized any gains in the portfolio. As above, if a
wealthy donor wants to maximize lifetime giving,
he may be better off donating at least some of that
cash to a DAF.56 Again, however, this benefit is not
unique to a DAF — the donor could get the same
result donating directly to an operating charity.
Rather, the DAF provides a simplified way to set
aside that money when the donor hasn’t decided on
ultimate charities or would otherwise like to have
relatively smooth giving over the years.
D. Forced Realizations
DAFs also provide some tax benefit when the
donor would be forced to realize a gain anyway.
Perhaps the donor will be selling stock in an initial
public offering or a buyout, the underlying com-
pany is redeeming shares, or the donor has to divest
itself of particular assets because of government
service or a similar conflict of interest. If a donor can
meet his charitable goals by donating assets that he
would otherwise have to sell, he clearly comes out
ahead compared with just giving cash.
That said, he could achieve the same tax benefit
by donating directly to operating charities, perhaps
in a restricted way to align with his desired distri-
bution schedule. However, if the donor wanted to
give to multiple charities over multiple years, doing
so with assets that would otherwise be sold this
year could be quite complicated. In that case, a DAF
may provide some simplification benefit, although
at a cost. On the other hand, for some donors, such
as small business owners, giving to a DAF also
means giving up control. Although the sponsoring
organizations market DAFs as mini-private-
foundations, they are in fact independent entities
completely separate from the donors and make no
promises about either investment strategy or ulti-
mate distributions.57 A company founder who
hopes to still exert some control while also avoiding
capital gain and receiving a deduction should use
the private foundation form instead.
E. Donating at Peak Value
Suppose that you plan a deduction for next year,
but you believe the market is at a high point this
year — so it would make sense to try to use stocks
to maximize the value of that deduction this year,
even though you plan for the actual gift to be next
year. Leaving aside that trying to time the market is
53IRS Statistics of Income, ‘‘2013 Individual Income Tax
Returns,’’ at 97, Table 2.1, available at https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-soi/13inalcr.pdf.
54This is a version of the common advice to company
founders to establish private foundations in the year of the
company’s initial public offering.
55Ignoring the issue of bracket shifting, discussed supra.
56To get maximum flexibility, the donor may donate 30
percent of his AGI to a private foundation and the remaining 20
percent to a DAF.
57Fidelity Charitable’s website states that it will sell any
contributed, non-publicly traded assets at its discretion, available
at http://www.fidelitycharitable.org/giving-account/what-yo
u-can-donate.shtml.
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a fool’s game, this tactic may generate some tax
benefit, but not in the way one might think. Con-
tinuing with our same example of a $100 donation
this year to a DAF or next year to an operating
charity, let’s now assume that the market will drop
in value by 10 percent rather than increase.
In both cases, the charity gets $90, so making the
donation today does not preserve the value of the
contribution, assuming it’s invested in a market
portfolio. Further, giving away the asset at peak
value doesn’t necessarily lock in a high value for the
deduction in present value terms because it still
needs to be parked somewhere, and in a market
portfolio, it faces the same risk as before. But the
donor could get a small tax benefit from realizing
the loss from investing the proceeds of the tax
deduction, leaving her with more after-tax cash
compared with giving directly to the charity next
year.58 The intuition is that by getting the value of
the deduction now, she will later be able to realize a
tax loss on the value of that deduction, whereas if
she held the property and later gave it directly, no
losses would be realized.59 To achieve this result,
however, she would have to have some offsetting
gains.
The situation is different for a unique asset,
rather than a market portfolio. Company founders
and executives, for example, may be privy to in-
sider knowledge that the value of their company’s
stock will fall in the future. If that company’s stock
is not correlated with the market, donating to a
DAF today to get the higher deduction value versus
waiting may create a real benefit. The deduction
would be at its peak value and then would be
invested in a market portfolio that could grow even
as the original asset declined in value. For example,
David Yermack has shown that the chairs and CEOs
of public companies tend to make large donations
of their company’s stock to their private founda-
tions right before a sharp decline in the company’s
share price.60 But the donor could retain control in
the private foundation context; that’s less likely to
be the case with a DAF. Thus, the donor would
again have to balance the value of getting a higher
deduction today with losing control of the under-
lying asset.61
F. Nontax Benefits
DAFs are not without some benefits — they are
just not primarily tax benefits. The main advantage
of DAFs is that they provide a simple and conve-
nient way to fund contributions to operating chari-
ties with appreciated property. For example, if a
donor wished to donate to five charities in five
equal amounts using appreciated property, she
would have to divvy up the property among the
five charities (assuming they were even able to
receive property). A single donation to Fidelity,
followed by advice on how to distribute the pro-
ceeds, could be much simpler.
But this means treating the DAF simply as a
conduit for the donation of appreciated property —
there really would be no fund to speak of. Further-
more, although it might be difficult for a donor to
make the five donations of appreciated property
herself, for those with investment managers or
financial advisers, direct donations may be just as
simple as donations to a DAF — they just need to
tell their adviser to transfer the appropriate
amounts to the charities’ custodial accounts and let
him do the math.
Similarly, DAFs may simplify donations of non-
publicly traded assets. Many operating charities,
especially smaller ones, are not set up to handle, for
example, hedge fund or private equity partnership
interests. But the commercial gift funds make very
clear that they will take anything. Again, however,
this is not a tax-specific issue — presumably large
and sophisticated charities would be happy to take
the assets directly.
But even if there is some convenience and flex-
ibility from using the DAF as a conduit for gifts of
58This is just a straight application of Equation (2), when a
negative r increases the value of giving to a DAF today rather
than giving to an operating charity next year.
59I’m assuming here that the donor would still have some
appreciated gain in the asset even after the drop in value, so she
would still prefer to give the asset directly. If, however, she had
a high basis, she would instead realize the loss, and the above
example wouldn’t apply.
60David Yermack, ‘‘Deductio Ad Absurdum,’’ 94 J. Fin. Econ.
107 (2009).
61See supra Section III.D.
Table 4. Donating at Market Peak
Give to DAF
This Year
Give to Charity
Next Year
Y1 starting cash
balance
$100 $100
Y1 gift $100 $0
Value of Y1 tax
deduction
$40 $0
Y2 funds for
charity
$90 $90
Y2 gift to
operating charity
$90 (from DAF) $90 (direct)
Value of Y2 tax
deduction
$0 $36
Y2 cash balance $36 $36
Y2 after-tax cash
balance
$36.80 $36
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property, what about the fund part? Why use a DAF
to set aside assets to fund later contributions? As
I’ve already shown above, there is little tax benefit
to establishing a fund, and there is perhaps a tax
cost for many donors. I think this fact is not
appreciated by most donors. But could there be
nontax benefits? In my view there must be some
personal or psychological value to having some-
thing with the trappings of a private foundation,
but without the hassle and with better tax treat-
ment. But that would be based on the fundamental
fiction that the DAF remains the donor’s. A donor
may imagine that the DAF would create a legacy
that would, for example, provide some family unity
or philanthropic role after the donor’s death, much
like if the family sat on the board of a private
foundation.62 But in reality, it is a pale imitation
with much less control over investment strategy,
foundation management, or even charitable distri-
butions. Being able to call a bookkeeping entry at
Fidelity Charitable the ‘‘John R. Brooks Founda-
tion’’ may seem nice, but it is ultimately an expen-
sive form of vanity.
IV. Conclusion
Commentary on DAFs generally concludes that
they may be a problem for philanthropy. The huge
volume of gifts flowing to, and the accumulated
assets of, the commercial gift funds imply a lot of
money staying on the sidelines rather than support-
ing the very real charitable needs of society. Fur-
thermore, the more the money stays on the
sidelines, the more it gets sucked away as fees for
investment managers. The typical reform proposal
is to require some minimum payout rate for DAFs
to ensure that the contributions to the funds flow
out relatively quickly to operating charities. I share
those concerns and generally support those propos-
als.
However, I also find in this report that the
concerns about DAFs from a tax policy perspective
may be overblown. For most donors most of the
time, there is no substantial tax benefit to donating
to a DAF, and there may even be a tax cost.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, many donors
would be better off holding on to the assets they
plan to use to fund gifts in future years rather than
giving them to a DAF all at once today. Similarly,
there is no real revenue loss to the government in
present value terms for allowing a full deduction
for contributions to a DAF. This may compound the
underlying problem with DAFs, however, because
the sponsoring organizations are really the only
ones that get any real benefit.
This conclusion does not mean that there is no
role for tax policy. If a misunderstanding of the tax
benefits encourages excessive donations to DAFs
and relatively slow payouts to operating charities,
the tax law needs to respond. A first step, however,
would be to inform potential donors that DAFs are
not all that they seem.
(Figures appear on the following pages.)
62Although, importantly, a decedent’s heirs do not necessar-
ily get control. Vanguard Charitable, for example, states that
DAFs without a specific succession plan will automatically be
transferred to the general fund, which Vanguard Charitable uses
at its sole discretion (available at https://www.vanguard
charitable.org/individuals/leave_legacy).
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Figure 1. DAF Contributions
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Figure 2. DAF Distributions
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Figure 3. DAF Total Assets
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Figure 4. DAF Annual Return
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